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More on Testing for Validity Instead of Looking for It 
 
Using Monte Carlo simulations and reanalyzing the data of a validation study of the AEIM emotional 
intelligence test, we demonstrated that an atheoretical approach and the use of weak statistical 
procedures can result in biased validity estimates.  These procedures included stepwise regression—
and the general case of failing to include important theoretical controls—extreme scores analysis, and 
ignoring heteroscedasticity as well as measurement error. The authors of the AEIM test responded by 
offering more complete information about their analyses, allowing us to further examine the perils of 
ignoring theory and correct statistical procedures. In this paper we show with extended analyses that 
the AEIM test is invalid. 
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Introduction 
Using Monte Carlo simulations and an empirical example (Warwick, Nettelbeck, & Ward, 
2010a)  we recently demonstrated that an atheoretical approach and the use of poor statistical 
procedures can result in biased validity estimates (see Antonakis & Dietz, in press). In our study we 
showed that the Ability Emotional Intelligence Measure (AEIM) was invalid and should not be used 
for assessment purposes. Warwick et al. (in press) responded by offering more complete information 
about their analyses.  
Their response was forthcoming and candid, explaining their choice of regression models and 
variables; we are also pleased to see in the meantime that the AEIM has been “withdrawn from use” 
(Warwick, Nettelbeck, & Ward, 2010b, p. 152). In their response, Warwick et al. (in press) (a) agreed 
that testing incremental validity is a “theory-driven endeavor” that should include established control 
variables, (b) stated that they “incorrectly used” standard statistical terminology (i.e., “stepwise” 
regression when they meant “hierarchical”), (c) mentioned that they had “not well understood” nor 
foreseen the problems that heteroscedasticity and measurement error can cause for estimating validity, 
and (d) acknowledged that they “overstated” their case (p. XXX). 
Despite the evidence showing that the AEIM is invalid, the response by Warwick et al. (in 
press) unfortunately also attempted to justify the use of statistical analyses that produce uninterpretable 
findings. Given that we now know the precise models used in their attempts to validate the AEIM, we 
can add to our first article illustrating even more clearly how the lack of theory and flawed analyses 
undermine validation studies. Although we were glad to hear that Warwick et al. (in press) did not use 
stepwise regression, the simulations we published revealed  the problems with this exploratory 
regression procedure and should serve as a stern warning to researchers who may consider using it. 
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In our rejoinder, we address two major aspects of Warwick et al.’s (in press) response that merit 
further consideration: (a) the lack of theory in the choice of control variables, and (b) flawed analyses 
due to the use of extreme scores. 
On choosing control variables: Theory, theory, and more theory 
 We see validity testing as a theory-driven endeavor such that when testing the incremental 
validity of a new construct with respect to dependent outcomes, one would inquire about existing 
theories that also explain this outcome. For example, when predicting loneliness from emotional 
intelligence, one would review theories of loneliness. These theories include dispositional approaches; 
and, it appears obvious that among dispositional predictors, neuroticism and extraversion are the most 
likely candidates (cf. Lasgaard, 2007). For example, extraverts are motivated to seek-out the company 
of others and are gregarious, and usually have a larger network of friends. Thus, they should be less 
lonely than introverts (see review by Heinrich & Gullone, 2006). In light of these arguments, 
correlations larger than .50 reported in several studies are not surprising (Burger, 1995; Lasgaard, 
2007; Lasgaard & Elklit, 2009). 
What is surprising to us is that Warwick et al. (2010) state that incremental validity is a theory-
driven exercise, yet they did not follow through when they examined the incremental validity of their 
emotional intelligence test; for example, they did not theorize extraversion as a predictor of loneliness. 
Instead, Warwick et al. claimed that “statistically significant personality variables [were] neuroticism 
and conscientiousness” (in press, p. XXX), although the latter variable correlated only r = -.12 with 
loneliness; however, the two strongest personality correlates of loneliness were, as theory would 
suggest, neuroticism (r = .55) and extraversion (r = -.49) (see Table 1 in Antonakis & Dietz, in press).  
Estimating a model where only neuroticism and conscientiousness are used along with 
intelligence while ignoring measurement error and heteroscedasticity gives the allure of incremental 
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validity for the consensus score. However, this coefficient is confounded given that there are important 
omitted variables in the regression model (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, in press). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We initially estimated the model precisely as they did in their original paper and now as 
explicitly reported by Warwick, et al. (in press). We added the variables in three hierarchical blocks: 
Cognitive ability (block 1), neuroticism and conscientiousness (block 2), and emotional intelligence 
(EI) consensus and confidence scores (block 3). We then determined whether the r-square change in 
block 3 was significant, as an indication of the incremental validity of their measures. Warwick et al. 
(in press) reported a significant regression coefficient for the consensus score. However, they did not 
report that the r-square change in the last block—the simultaneous test that the two EI coefficients are 
significantly different from zero—which was marginally significant: F(2, 266) = 2.96, p < .10 (refer to 
Table 1, Model 1). This latter finding should already have raised red flags concerning the test’s 
incremental validity. Note, using a heteroscedastic-robust variance estimator, which is required given 
the nonnormal distribution of the residuals, made this F-statistic even weaker: 2.63, p < .10; correcting 
both for measurement error and heteroscedasticity lowered the F-statistic further, 1.74, p > .10. Thus, 
even using the Warwick et al. (2010) specification, the r-square change was not significant, showing 
that the AEIM has no incremental validity. 
In any case, Model 1 is not interpretable due to an omitted-variable bias. Theoretical arguments 
prescribe that extraversion should not have been omitted in the regression. Furthermore, as mentioned 
in Antonakis and Dietz (2010), when considering personality it is appropriate to include all personality 
controls because even if they are not significant individually, they may be jointly significant. Adding 
extraversion instead of conscientiousness to the regression model reduced the coefficient of the 
consensus score to -.10 (from -.13), making the coefficient marginally-significant, p < .10 (see Model 
2); also, the r-square change for adding the two EI scores (i.e., adding block 3) was nonsignificant, p > 
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.10. Estimating a model where empathy—another theoretically relevant predictor of loneliness—was 
added reduced the coefficient of the consensus score to -.06, p > .20; again, the r-square change for the 
two EI coefficients was non-significant, p > .40 (Model 3). Finally, adding all the personality controls 
(Model 4) reduced the coefficient of the consensus score to -.04, p > .50 (and again, the r-square 
change for the two coefficients was non-significant). The correct model (Model 5, which we already 
reported in Antonakis and Dietz, in press) that uses an errors-in-variables regression model with 
bootstrapped standard errors shows that the EI scores remain nonsignificant. 
Extreme-scores analyses: Dividing and conquering leaves the empire in shambles 
 Warwick et al. (in press) continue justifying the truncation of samples and the use of extreme 
scores for establishing validity although doing so makes it impossible to establish population estimates. 
In their original article they had referred, in ipse dixit fashion, to Petrides, Frederickson, and Furnham 
(2004), who had formed extreme groups in their study of emotional intelligence. Even in Petrides et 
al.’s article, however, it was indicated that for inferential statistics extreme-groups analyses must not be 
used; they noted expressly that these results were for informational purposes adding a caveat emptor 
that these results should “not be extrapolated” (p. 285). Furthermore, we cited Heckman (1979) and 
Tobin (1958)—Nobel prize winners in economics—who developed methods to recover population 
estimates in the presence of naturally-occurring truncation (suggesting that truncation is an undesirable 
property in samples, which should be avoided at all costs). We showed too that, in addition to reducing 
power, truncating a sample into small groups (i.e., from between n = 22 to n = 41) creates artificial 
variation, capitalizes on chance, and produces highly suspect estimates (Antonakis & Dietz, in press). 
 In their response to our first article, Warwick et al. (in press) now suggest that because their 
instrument was “demonstrably blunt” and the distribution of the AEIM scores was “non linear,” it was 
thus “reasonable” to estimate regression models in groups of extreme scores (p. XXX). This argument 
is a non sequitur; non-linearity is not a justification for extreme scores analysis. Instead, if theoretical 
7 
 
reasons exist to assume curvilinearity, one would add a quadratic (and if needed cubic) term to model 
this curvature (Aiken & West, 1991). Although neither theory nor visual inspection of their data 
suggested a curvilinear relation, we estimated a model with a quadratic term, which proved to be 
nonsignificant when we used OLS regression (and the estimator did not converge when we employed 
errors-in-variables regression due to the relatively low reliability of the EI consensus score). Finally, 
supposing Warwick et al. (in press) were referring to problems with outliers instead of nonlinearities, 
we also estimated the full model using Huber’s robust regression (Huber, 1964). Again, the EI 
coefficients were neither individually nor jointly significant when using the full specification. In 
summary, validation studies require that scientists arrive at interpretable population estimates; the 
truncation of data simply has no place in such scientific efforts. 
Conclusion 
We appreciate that Warwick et al. offered more information on their validation study of their 
emotional intelligence measure. Our analysis of their data leads us to conclude that it should not be 
used for diagnostic testing, whether for clinical, industrial, or training purposes. As far as ability-based 
measures of emotional intelligence are concerned, the invalidity of Warwick et al.’s measure seems 
representative (see also Amelang & Steinmayr, 2006; Fiori & Antonakis, in press; Føllesdal & Hagtvet, 
2009; Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004). We hope that more researchers will join our effort to call for 
stronger conceptual and methodological standards for developing such measures (Antonakis, 
Ashkanasy, & Dasborough, 2009; Antonakis & Dietz, 2010).  
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Table 1: Errors-in-variables Regression Models Predicting Loneliness 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5  
VARIABLES Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
                
EI Consensus   -.13**   -.10*   -.06   -.04   .08 
   (-2.16)   (-1.75)   (-1.08)   (-.68)   (.76) 
EI Confidence   -.03   -.03   -.02   -.03   -.05 
   (-.63)   (-.62)   (-.44)   (-.60)   (-.48) 
Cog. Ability -.14** -.04 .04 -.14** -.10** -.04 -.14** -.07 -.04 -.14** -.09* -.07 -0.17*** -0.14 -.18 
 (-2.36) (-.75) (.68) (-2.36) (-2.08) (-.62) (-2.36) (-1.52) (-.62) (-2.36) (-1.95) (-1.14) (-2.72) (-1.62) (-1.37) 
Extraversion     -.33*** -.32***  -.31*** -.31***  -.36*** -.35***  -0.48*** -.49*** 
     (-6.36) (-6.13)  (-5.99) (-5.88)  (-6.87) (-6.75)  (-4.02) (-3.55) 
Neuroticism  .54*** .53***  .40*** .39***  .44*** .43***  .43*** .42***  0.52*** .52*** 
  (1.58) (1.23)  (7.47) (7.32)  (8.08) (7.79)  (8.06) (7.80)  (4.56) (4.13) 
Openness           .18*** .18***  0.43*** .45** 
           (3.66) (3.61)  (2.92) (2.48) 
Conscientiousness  -.12** -.11**        -.05 -.05  0.00 .02 
  (-2.26) (-2.15)        (-1.06) (-1.04)  (0.01) (.14) 
Agreeableness           -.11** -.10**  -0.28* -.31 
           (-2.06) (-1.97)  (-1.68) (-1.53) 
Empathy        -.14*** -.13**  -.15*** -.14**  -0.22** -.23** 
        (-2.97) (-2.50)  (-2.85) (-2.53)  (-2.15) (-2.11) 
R-square change .02 .30 .01 .02 .37 .01 .02 .39 .01 .02 .43 .01 .02 .57 .00 
F-test for ∆ R-square - 57.93*** 2.96* - 82.79*** 2.04 - 59.75*** .79 - 34.82*** .51 - 20.44*** .70 
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R-squared .02 .32 .33 .02 .39 .40 .02 .41 .42 .02 .45 .46 .02 .59 .59 
                
 
Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; parameter estimates are standardized; models are estimated in three nested blocks wherein we progressively added variables 
to the regression model and tested for the significance of the r-square change; Models 1-4 are estimated using a standard regression estimator and numbers in 
parentheses are t statistics using a normal variance estimator; Model 5 is the full errors-in-variables regression model with all controls, as reported in Antonakis and 
Dietz (in press) and (numbers in parentheses are z statistics from normal bootstrapped standard errors--findings regarding the AEIM were unchanged when using 
percentile or bias-corrected bootstraps; N=272.  
 
